Rivalry by Delegation: Strategic Insecurity, Proxy Networks, and State Fragility in Saudi-Iran Competition

Abstract

Why does the Saudi-Iran rivalry continue to destabilize regional arenas even when direct diplomatic relations improve? This article examines the mechanisms through which strategic competition is translated into proxy conflict and, in turn, into weakened state authority. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with eight Saudi-based diplomats conducted between November 2024 and February 2025, the study uses a theoretically informed thematic analysis to connect balance-of-power reasoning with contemporary scholarship on conflict delegation. The findings show that the rivalry is not adequately explained by sectarian difference alone. Instead, strategic insecurity and status competition generate a demand for indirect influence; sectarian identity supplies a language of legitimacy and mobilization; and proxy sponsorship provides differentiated military and political instruments. Saudi Arabia is perceived as relying more heavily on financial leverage, diplomatic coalitions, conventional military capacity, and airpower, whereas Iran is viewed as pursuing strategic depth through embedded armed networks, asymmetric capabilities, and durable local partnerships. These strategies diffuse arms, empower actors with autonomous agendas, fragment political authority, and restrict humanitarian access. The article develops the concept of delegated balancing to explain how regional powers seek equilibrium through local partners while transferring the principal costs of rivalry to conflict-affected societies. It further argues that interstate détente may reduce immediate escalation without automatically dismantling proxy infrastructures. Sustainable de-escalation therefore requires a layered settlement combining bilateral dialogue, local political inclusion, limits on external military support, and the restoration of state institutions.